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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, we 
witnessed the end of the idea of a division of 
the world between good and bad, between 
capitalists and proponents of the planned 
economy, between right and left, between 
pro-Communists and pro-Americans; and 
again, disappeared the need of so many emerg-
ing countries to define themselves as a “third 
block” as opposed to the bipolar system. The 
economic idea of a first, second and third 
world could have been considered overcome. 
The world was forced to re-read itself and 
to understand that it was necessary to start 
a twenty-five year transition.  
The forms of power and the alleged 
crisis of the nation-state in the 
contemporary age
Beatrice Benocci*
thinking about international relations in a 
completely different way.
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RESUMEN
Después del colapso soviético, fuimos testigos 
del fin de la idea de una división del mundo 
entre el bien y el mal, entre capitalistas y par-
tidarios de la economía planificada, entre la 
derecha y la izquierda, entre procomunistas y 
proamericanos; y de nuevo desapareció la nece-
sidad de tantos países emergentes de definirse 
como un “tercer bloque” frente al sistema bipo-
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lar. La idea económica de un primer, segundo 
y tercer mundo podría haberse considerado 
superada. El mundo se vio obligado a releerse 
a sí mismo y a comprender que era necesario 
empezar a pensar en las relaciones internacio-
nales de una manera completamente diferente.
Palabras clave: Soft Power, Hard Power, 
Estado-nación, globalización
a Twenty-Five Year Transition 
PREfACE
John Nye states that Trump is undermining 
US soft power. “America first”, points out the 
political scientist in an interview released in 
January 2018, “is a policy whose purpose is to 
make others think of being second, and is hav-
ing the negative effect of reducing American 
soft power. Most public opinion polls show 
that the United States is less attractive to other 
countries today than it was before Trump” (Be-
chis, 2018). Even within the United Nations, 
the American attitude embodied by Ambassa-
dor Nikky Haley, is creating a cohesive group 
of states that resent the new American policy, 
now called “sharp power”. 
1. A NEw ERA
The sunrise of 1992 marked the end of bipo-
larity, of that system of economic, military and 
political relations that had characterized the his-
tory of the world since the end of the Second 
World War; a system of relations founded on 
the existence of two superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and guaranteed 
by a nuclear deterrent system, which in the end 
had preserved the world from a third world war. 
The Soviet Union imploded as a consequence 
of the reforms tenaciously desired by Mikhail 
Gorbachev. The last Soviet leader, soaked in 
those ideas launched by Nikita Khrushchev 
in the late fifties that had characterized the 
years of his formation, had intended to bring 
his country to a contemporary socialism, able 
on one hand to ensure itself, that is, the Soviet 
system, and on the other to really respond 
to the needs of citizens (Kotkin, 2010). But, 
contrary to what was expected Soviets did not 
want a more human socialism, they yearned for 
a consumer society as it had developed beyond 
the Iron Curtain. The Soviet Union did not col-
lapse under the burden of indebtedness or what 
was believed to be a sick economy, it had fallen 
because it was rejected by the Soviet citizens 
themselves. And Gorbachev had done noth-
ing but opening the Pandora’s vase. With this 
unexpected event ended forty-seven years of 
history that had been defined and conditioned 
by the presence of two equal super powers: ac-
cording to the definition given by their own 
former leaders Kennedy and Khrushchev, they 
were equal in military, economic and political 
capacity (Benocci, 2010).
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse 
we witnessed the end of the idea of a division 
of the world between good and bad, between 
capitalists and proponents of the planned 
economy, between right and left, between pro-
Communists and pro-Americans; and again, 
disappeared the need of so many emerging 
countries to define themselves as a “third block” 
as opposed to the bipolar system. The economic 
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idea of a first, second and third world could 
have been considered overcome1. The world 
was forced to re-read itself and to understand 
that it was necessary to start thinking about 
international relations in a completely differ-
ent way. The dissolution of the Soviet empire 
had not only left a geographical vacuum, which 
would be taken and occupied largely by Ger-
many and with it necessarily by the European 
Community (Benocci, 2017), it had deprived 
the majority of intellectuals, observers and 
Western political leaders of their most impor-
tant ideological point of reference. 
The years between 1993 and 2001, which 
without doubt can be considered “pioneering”, 
are characterized by the emergence of the idea 
of  a kind of unique thought. The political 
scientist Francis Fukuyama, who speaks of 
the end of history, contributes to the emer-
gence of this idea. In fact, with this statement 
he intends to clarify that a new international 
system - borrowed from the American model 
and characterized by a single economic and 
political system - was emerging or could have 
been affirmed. After all, the American model 
was the system that emerged victorious from 
the bipolar confrontation which in turn had 
characterized the history of the twentieth cen-
tury from the end of the Second World War. 
Ultimately, with the fall of the Soviet “dicta-
torship” the preconditions were created for the 
world of the so-called Anglosphere. As Donno 
(2017) reminds us the Anglosphere “was the 
center around which a new world commu-
nity could develop, a point of connection for 
the democratic movements of the world and 
finally a further point of coagulation for the 
entire West” (p. 16). In the early nineties the 
idea was that, after the English century, the 
nineteenth century, and the American short 
century, the twentieth century, the twenty-first 
century could be the century of the Anglo-
sphere, founded on the two cardinal principles 
of individual freedom and of the law, with its 
primacy of struggle against totalitarianism and 
statism (p. 23).
Especially in the United States, many peo-
ple believed it possible. The same American 
president Clinton came to affirm it publicly, 
when he invited to enlarge nato to the countries 
of Eastern Europe and to former Soviet repub-
lics. In 1999, Clinton favored the entry of the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into the 
Atlantic Alliance on the basis of the belief that 
the United States had won the Cold War and 
that they were responsible for the reorganization 
of European and international security. These 
hasty choices, well highlighted in the following 
years, would have created the conditions for new 
international crises. As the political scientist John 
Mearsheimer states in 2014:
“The most common version says that reason was 
the containment of Russia, but it is not. The policy-
makers surrounding Clinton sincerely joined a liberal 
view of international politics that the democratic in-
stitutions of America and Western Europe were the 
privileged, if not the only, instruments for achieving 
1 It is important to underline that since the Seventies, following Willy Brandt’s report of 1980, the definition of 
first, second and third world has been largely substituted by that of North and South of the world.
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peace and prosperity. If it worked in the West it will 
also work in Russia, they said. And they said it in good 
faith, genuinely animated by the desire to extend the 
model of thought to which they attributed the stability 
of the West. Not to mention that at that point Russia 
was a disastrous country, it was not a threat to anyone 
but to itself, other than containment. The ultimate 
goal was to involve Moscow in the alliance in some 
way” (Ferraresi, 2014). 
In the nineties, America was so immersed in 
this idea of  promoting its geopolitical theory 
that it was no longer able to conceive that other 
countries could adhere to other conceptions. 
At that point the idea of  the end of history by 
Francis Fukuyama was prevalent: liberal de-
mocracy was an inescapable destiny. Russia, 
on the other hand, remained faithful to the 
realist doctrine (Ferraresi, 2014).
Moreover, the American president had 
a good game. Yeltsin’s Russia, headed by the 
newly formed Russian Federation (December 
25, 1991), seemed far from regaining an inter-
national role and the Chechen situation was 
of no help at all2. In general, in those years the 
conflicts, mostly ethnic, and the crises, mostly 
local, required the intervention of meddling 
and peace forces; this contributed to confusing 
the role of UN intervention with that of nato. 
The United States of Clinton would not have 
retreated in front of the need for intervention 
in crisis areas, thus earning the name of “inter-
national policeman”. In the same years, many 
issues that had characterized international 
relations in previous decades, seemed to find 
a new composition, which excluded the use 
of violence. In fact, in Northern Ireland, tor-
mented by the so-called Troubles for decades, it 
was reached a first and then definitive ceasefire, 
the Good Friday of 1998; in the Middle East 
the Arab-Israeli conflict experienced a moment 
of great pacification thanks to two leaders, 
Arafat and Rabin, which under the leadership 
of President Clinton, signed the Oslo Accords 
in September 1993. Thanks to their efforts, 
in 1993 both leaders were awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. Finally, the sad and dramatic era 
of Apartheid ended in South Africa and in 
1994 Nelson Mandela was elected president 
of the Republic. The country faced a compli-
cated phase of normalization and, above all, 
it emerged from the international isolation 
to which it had been subjected due to the 
separation regime. It seemed possible that the 
soft power promoted by the Anglo-American 
sphere since the early twentieth century could 
exert an extraordinary influence in every part 
of the world. It seemed that a democratic trend 
could prevail, that the world could be pacified 
and that the United States could continue to 
be an essential reference point for any freedom 
enterprise (Donno, 2017).
2. A GloBAlizEd SySTEM
In the same years, however, the exercise of soft 
power did not seem to be just the prerogative 
of nation-states, it rather seemed to become the 
2 The crisis in Chechnya started immediately, first with an internal crisis and then subsequently resulted in a real 
war of independence that lasted for about twenty years (1991-2009).
1 1
A  t w e n t y - f i v e  y e a r  t r a n s i t i o n .  T h e  f o r m s  o f  p o w e r  a n d  t h e  a l l e g e d  c r i s i s …
D o s s i e r  T e m á T i c o
Revista  oASiS ,  iSSN:  1657-7558,  e- iSSN:  2346-2132,  Nº  28,  Jul io  -  Dic iembre de 2018,  pp.  7-24
prerogative of other important international 
actors. To understand this aspect, which fur-
ther complicates the analysis of this decade of 
profound change, we must let the creator of 
the term soft power, Joseph Nye explain what 
was happening: soft power is, according to 
Nye, the “soft” ability to induce other subjects 
to adopt a conduct conforming to the wishes 
of those who exercise the soft power without 
the use of weapons or economic pressures; in 
short, the ability to obtain sharing and par-
ticipation. The inner difficulty in soft power 
is to maintain a high level of credibility and 
consistency over time3. 
It should be emphasized that Nye’s happy 
intuition had in fact allowed a better evalua-
tion and interpretation of the real influence 
capacity exerted by a single country in the 
international arena. Soft power experts during 
the Cold War years were, as Nye pointed out, 
the United States and the Soviet Union. But 
during the 1990s, beside the Fukuyama theory 
of the end of history and of the overcoming 
of the nation-state, another idea emerged, 
strongly promoted by Nye himself, accord-
ing to which the centers of power were now 
multiple, in some cases very different from the 
nation-state that until 1992 had dominated 
the international scene.
In a post-bipolar phase, the concept of 
soft power was also rooted in subjects quite 
different from the nation-state, but which by 
their very economic or social nature were able 
to exert an important capacity of influence and 
address at the international level. Therefore, 
according to Nye himself, soft power actions 
could be exercised by non-governmental orga-
nizations (ngo’s), large economic groups, the 
Holy See, the European Union, but also by 
terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda or countries 
like Saudi Arabia. For example, the latter had 
successfully tried, over the years, to assert Wah-
habism worldwide. It was clear that a profound 
change in the international forum was in place, 
now also called to incorporate requests from 
below and not shared by the major global 
powers. The signature of the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997, that had not found the consensus of 
the United States, and the great demonstra-
tion in Seattle against the World Trade Orga-
nization (Wto), which sanctioned the birth of 
the Anti-Globalization Movement, were the 
expression of these new global political and 
social movements (Ceri, 2003; Montagna, 
2007; Adamo, 2016).
Throughout those years, along with the 
transformation experienced by the concept of 
soft power, a new process of globalization was 
established, which held within it the embryos 
of what would be its most tenacious opponents. 
The changes that were taking place, as we shall 
see, were interdependent and moved by the 
large diffusion of digital technologies. Before 
proceeding with the narration, it is worth re-
membering that even in the aftermath of the 
end of the Second World War, and even before 
3 The term invented by Joseph Nye in 1990, extended the concept of power of an international actor to the field 
of culture and ideals: a power exerts its capacity to influence in the world not only thanks to its economic or military 
system, but also through the diffusion of its values and its life system.
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its end, the world was seen as a globalized reality. 
In the political design of men like Roosevelt, 
the term globalization indicated the creation 
of an international system suitable for the safe-
guarding of peace, therefore capable of erasing 
the limits and risks implicit in the disorder of 
Versailles. They worked on the construction 
of a new order based on new global institu-
tions able to solve the problem of maintaining 
world peace, and rehabilitating the economy 
from disasters caused by war, in compliance 
with the American conception: “the creation 
of a commercial and financial system suitable 
to act as a framework within which the mar-
ket economy could give the world the greatest 
possible prosperity and economic growth in a 
climate of political and commercial freedom” 
(Di Nolfo, 1994, p. 586). 
Unlike the 1940s, the new globalization 
was favored by the idea of  the spread of the 
so-called unique thought, but as mentioned 
earlier it was strongly supported by new tech-
nologies, above all the Internet. In these years 
it was possible to observe a progressive reduc-
tion of trade barriers accompanied by a strong 
reduction in transport costs and communica-
tion services. The market became global and 
multinational companies or corporations were 
the main drivers of globalization (Barba Nava-
retti, 2013; Goldstein, 2011; Merton, 2013)4. 
The production of goods and services was no 
longer confined within the physical and legal 
boundaries of the nation-state, it could be re-
alized everywhere, far beyond the borders of 
the individual states. Suddenly, the availability 
of these new technologies made it possible 
to coordinate activities that were physically 
distant from each other. This resulted in the 
fragmentation of production processes and the 
consequential delocalization of production sys-
tems or parts of them to different and distant 
countries. Without entering into the specific 
mechanisms of market and finance, it should 
be remembered that international companies 
and financial institutions became less and less 
controllable, increasingly autonomous in their 
choices and free from the policies of the states. 
Within the space of just ten years, it was clear 
that the new globalization would have decreed 
not an improvement in living conditions at 
world level but would have created the condi-
tions for ever greater inequalities among work-
ers, states and different economic areas. Many 
were the voices of protest and dissent against 
the new global economic process perceived as 
a danger, since it went far beyond the classical 
idea of a free market; it not only seemed to act 
in a condition of lack of state or international 
controls, but also it ended up damaging the 
environment and increasing climate changes 
(Wallach, Sforza, 1999). Many economists 
would have asked vigorously that this kind of 
new free trade were put under control; some 
of them also would have asked economic and 
political actors to act and reason in terms of fair 
trade. In those years it became also clear that 
4 As Barba Navaretti underlines, until the Second World War only the States managed and owned the resources. 
After the war other actors, i.e. corporations, began to manage and own resources. Among states there was an impor-
tant change: at the end of the sixties United States had the leadership of the world market, after twenty years Japan 
prevailed; nowadays China and India, as well as Brazil, can be considered leaders of the global market.
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while some areas, once embraced the global 
free market, would have benefited from it, oth-
ers, less rich in resources or totally deprived, 
would have been dramatically penalized if not 
definitively excluded from the global market. 
Against this process, seen and perceived as the 
building of an increasingly unequal world, 
moved the so-called people of Seattle - just 
mentioned above. Thanks to a globalized 
communication, daughter of the same new 
technologies, it would have been constituted 
and then increasingly organized a global move-
ment, whose main instrument of affirmation 
was precisely the global information, quite 
distinct and far from the one advocated by 
traditional media. This new instrument was 
the Internet, through which it was (and is also 
now) possible to organize all around the world 
events, demonstrations, actions of contrast 
against the new symbols of global power like 
G8, wto and fmi (Vitali, 2001).
3. EURoPEAN UNioN iN TRoUBlES, 
ChiNA ANd holy SEE
As William Keylor claimed in 2003, in his 
book A World of Nations, the nation-states 
would continue to play an important role 
also in the new globalized world. However, 
it is certain that they were experiencing a 
phase of profound transformation. Expres-
sion of this assumption were in those years 
the European states that faced the change in 
a unique and singular way. Although aware 
of the need to face the new global challenges 
in the guise of a single political entity, as the 
European Union could have been, the Euro-
pean countries remained firmly faithful to the 
idea of the nation-state. So, as a community 
without international legal status, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) went through the nineties 
and early 2000s. These years were profoundly 
difficult for the EU. Its eastern front collapses 
under the weight of Soviet dissolution and 
the process of monetary union proceeds with 
great difficulty. The EU faces change in its own 
way, expanding and incorporating Eastern 
Europe. It also overcomes the difficult knot of 
the single currency. In this way it responds to 
several requests, the German one of unification 
and security, the European Union ones of eco-
nomic and monetary union, the containment 
of united Germany, and security of its bor-
ders. In this way, the European Community 
plays an important role: it ends up pacifying 
the Eastern European countries and reducing 
the risks of war and crisis emerged along the 
Danube-Balkan axis. But it was a cyclopean ef-
fort, whose consequences are still being paid by 
Europeans in terms of political and economic 
difficulties (Benocci, 2017, pp. 154-158). At 
the beginning of the 2000s the EU was rec-
ognized as a civil and a geo-economic power, 
whose experience was considered replicable 
in Southeast Asia and Latin America. It is in-
teresting to remember that in the same years 
Italy experienced the end of its first republic. 
The country was full involved in the so-called 
5  Tangentopoli: the use of the term has been affirmed since 1992 following the judicial inquiries carried out by the 
Magistrature of Milan and subsequently carried out also in other Italian cities, which led to the dissolution of some 
Italian historical parties, including Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and Partito Socialista Italiano (psi).
B e a t r i c e  B e n o c c i
1 4
Revista  OASIS ,  ISSN:  1657-7558,  E- ISSN:  2346-2132,  Nº  28,  Jul io  -  Dic iembre de 2018,  pp.  7-24
Tangentopoli5. Its political and economic in-
stitutions, as well as the entire Italian society, 
were swept by a tsunami, which cancelled a 
malfeasance’s system and with it fifty years of 
a system of governance. Italy did not seem to 
take part in the global change taking place, it 
did not have the strength, folded in an attempt 
to save the savable. The Italian political forces, 
or what was left of them, would have woken 
up very late to understand that the world had 
changed, that Europe had changed, that those 
concepts and terms that had marked the Ital-
ian political confrontation throughout the 
previous decades were now largely outworn. It 
would have been hard for Italians to identify 
new issues and find new political guidelines, 
but the Italian nation-state was still alive.
Now it is not possible to analyze those 
years without realizing that among the emerg-
ing countries, China could have taken on, 
if desired, a role of fearsome competitor in 
the eyes of the Americans. It is interesting to 
remember that, in times of bipolarity, Wash-
ington had never underestimated China, con-
stantly requesting the Soviets to avoid China 
become part of the atomic club, so obliging the 
Chinese to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
which once again was aimed to make perma-
nent the exclusion of Beijing and Bonn from 
the list of nations capable of holding nuclear 
weapons. During the pioneering years we are 
talking about, China emerged as an economic 
and potentially also a cultural power. In fact, 
China was able to export capital, technology 
and labor force at the same time. In a few 
years it would have been widely recognized as 
a geo-economic power. It was a member with 
full rights of the BRIC. Undoubtedly, it was 
a military power. To put it in terms of power, 
China seemed to have two of the three ele-
ments that constitute an international power: 
economic and military power. But, unexpect-
edly, the Asian country tried to act in terms of 
soft power. For example, like many European 
countries, it refused armed intervention in 
conflict areas. Due to this, it was associated not 
only to the EU, but also to Russia. And it was 
also clear that China was investing heavily in 
its own culture: Chinese seemed to be able to 
benefit from their fascinating traditional cul-
ture and their continuous economic successes. 
Despite this, as Rossi (2013) underlined, 
China could have not competed yet in terms 
of culture with Europe and the United States. 
At the same time China and the United States 
could have come into conflict if the Chinese 
had decided to control the seas, to seek military 
equality in order to control and monitor the 
commercial and resource supply routes. An-
other possible area of confrontation between 
the two countries could have been the African 
continent. Here, apparently undisturbed, the 
Chinese were proceeding to the purchase of 
arable land for future agricultural production. 
Another unexpected actor of those trou-
bled years was the Holy See. As we have pre-
viously said, Nye inserts the Holy See among 
the actors who use soft power with great skill. 
In this specific case, we are dealing with a 
subject lacking both hard power instruments 
and an internationally competitive economic 
system, which makes the instrument of per-
suasion its main instrument of international 
dialogue. As Rossi (2013) recalls, the Holy 
See intervenes in global issues, opposes war, 
calls for peace among peoples and deals with 
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issues of equality and social equity always and 
exclusively through its encyclicals. It usually 
intervenes by keeping faith with the principle 
of freedom of its action and its universal role. 
But, the historian still observes, the attack on 
the Twin Towers in 2001 obliged the Church 
of John Paul II to take a precise orientation: 
even in the face of Islamic fundamentalism it 
could not share the idea of the preventive war 
as advocated by Bush Jr. So, during the second 
Gulf War, at the very moment when the inter-
national community was deeply divided, the 
Holy See assumed the moral duty to defend 
international law and the primacy of the UN, 
stating that inter-religious dialogue could have 
fought the Islamic fundamentalism. Although 
it could not avoid the intervention in Iraq, 
Rossi recalls, the Holy See worked tenaciously 
in its role of moral persuasion, helping to iso-
late even more Washington internationally.
4. ThE ENd of A UNiqUE ThoUGhT
The idea of being able to proceed along the 
furrow of a unique thought would have been 
interrupted dramatically and definitively on 
September 11, 2001 with the attack on the 
Twin Towers of New York. The world and, 
above all, the United States, were forced to 
awaken. The attack on the Twin Towers un-
dermined the optimism that had led to give 
priority to soft power (Rossi, 2006, p. 261). 
In the same years of world globalization a 
criminal power was born; it was one of the 
consequences of the political choices made 
in times of Cold War. It had no restraints and 
did not recognize limits to its actions. Grown 
up and fed by the great powers and their allies 
in Afghanistan, it was challenging the West-
ern countries, their cultural model and their 
allies. The Twin Towers’ attack had unveiled 
the protagonists of this new kind of interna-
tional terrorism: the Taliban led by Osama 
Bin Laden (Magdi, 2001; Guolo, 2001; Ro-
mano, 2004)6. These new terrorists, who had 
their theoretical roots in the violence of the 
words of Ayatollah Khomeini and in the anti-
Western movements that had characterized 
the seventies in the Middle East and North 
Africa (Campanini, 2006), were not afraid to 
deal with that unique thought that seemed 
to have won the ideological war; in a certain 
way they rejected and fought tenaciously the 
idea of globalization that seemed to be able to 
spread everywhere in the world. Above all, with 
their criminal and violent actions they obliged 
the Western world to deal with an idea of risk 
unknown until that moment. They imposed 
the exercise of a new reflection. They revealed 
what till then had remained in the corner and 
well hidden: the world was not pacified, the 
risk had not been overcome, the idea of a single 
gendarme was not feasible. The United States 
was forced to acknowledge that it possessed an 
oversized military capacity for the defense of its 
country alone, but undersized to cope with the 
new terrorist challenge. But unlike its desire, 
it was aware that the West was not compact. 
6 The attacks on the American embassies of Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam (August 7, 1998) and the attack on the 
Warship Uss Cole, docked in the port of Aden (12 October 2000), had also been linked to Bin Laden.
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The United States did not find consensus: its 
former allies were no more ready to follow 
Washington unconditionally. As Del Pero 
(2011) points out, the 11 September’s event 
changed drastically the situation, it nourished 
a sense of fear and vulnerability destined to 
justify radical and extreme choices; it ended 
to alter the internal balance of the American 
administration by penalizing the most moder-
ate positions (p. 112).
At that time, the United States was led 
by Bush junior, who had managed to beat the 
Democratic candidate Al Gore, with a pro-
gram focused on the fight against the economic 
crisis and on the recovery of relations with 
Latin America (Di Ruzza, 2011); a sort of re-
turn to normality that assigned a low profile to 
foreign policy. The terrorist attack completely 
transformed his government program. Imme-
diately, from the first hours after the terrorist 
attack, Bush defined the subsequent American 
reaction as a “war against terror” and moved to 
win it. Bush called on the democratic world to 
struggle to export democracy everywhere and 
to accept the idea of preventive war. It is very 
interesting to remember that before then the 
United States had always rejected the idea of a 
preventive war. For example, on the occasion 
of the 1956 Suez crisis, Eisenhower had tena-
ciously opposed the idea advocated by Israel 
that it could be possible to proceed with acts 
of preventive war in order to guarantee the 
security of its territory (Donno, 1998). Del 
Pero (2011) still remembers that the total and 
global nature of the challenge justified the use 
of any means and the refusal of any constraint 
to the deployment of power. Internally and 
internationally, the American administration 
had to be free to act without legal, geopolitical 
or economic restraints (p. 113).
In 2001, Bush asked for and obtained 
from his historical allies the help for an in-
vasion of Afghanistan. Even Schroeder, the 
Chancellor of Germany, assured and provided 
the maximum support to usa. It is important 
to remember that Germany always opposed 
to being involved in war actions (Benocci, 
2017, p. 149). However, after the Operation 
Enduring Freedom, successfully concluded, 
some European countries thought they could 
not proceed anymore along the path outlined 
by the American president. On the occasion 
of the second Gulf War in 2003 they denied 
their help. In the following years, France, Ger-
many, Russia, China would have emphasized 
their firm opposition to the preventive armed 
intervention policy inaugurated by the Bush 
administration. In 2008, at the end of his 
second term, Bush left a country in economic 
crisis - the bubble of the subprime had just 
burst - and the international arena was now 
characterized by the presence of many actors 
able to perform a persuasive function, that is, 
to exercise soft power. Among these, emerged 
strongly the European Community, Germany, 
the so-called bric Group (Brazil, Russia, India 
7 It is clear, that in this case the reference is to Turkey pre-Erdogan and pre-Arab Spring. In the space of a few 
years, Turkey has moved from being a model of democratic government, cohesive with European and Western values, 
internationally appreciated, to a dictatorial and repressive model ever closer to forms of Islamic fundamentalism. This 
is what has seriously endangered Turkey’s entry into the EU (Bianchi, 2015; Custodero, & Gallori, 2016).
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and China) and even Turkey7. All these coun-
tries advocated an idea of unarmed interven-
tion in situations of crisis or conflict. At the 
same time, they played an important role from 
the point of view of economic and financial 
aid to the countries in difficulty. Some of 
them were committed to the protection of the 
environment and they fought against climate 
change. Beside the first ones there were virtu-
ous economic areas, such as the Southeast Asia 
or the Latin American world. Although the 
United States remained the only super power, 
many countries continued to be detractors 
of the American model. United States still 
inspired an idea of a country, which thanks to 
its military and economic power, was intent 
on building an empire. The anti-Americanism 
that emerged since the times of Cold War 
had continued to spread, to strengthen itself, 
even when the American commitment against 
Islamic fundamentalism was at most. The 
United States seemed more alone than ever. 
5. AMERiCAN SoliTUdE8
The difficulties faced in those years by the Bush 
administration are highlighted by many ob-
servers and scholars. The primacy of politics, as 
an art of the possible, should have reduced the 
causes of social instability, the risks of conflicts 
and wars through the creation of a new world 
order; a world, as previously stated, based on 
the American model or the so-called Anglo-
sphere. At the beginning of the 2000s this 
was a bet that could no longer be postponed, 
a bet of a political and cultural nature since the 
threats were no longer ideological in nature, as 
they had been in the so-called short century, 
but they were the result of a conflict between 
civilization, a sort of cultural incompatibility, 
before than political or economic. But the 
United States seemed not to be able to pursue 
this goal any more. Hence the dilemma expe-
rienced by the American leadership: by many 
invoked in its role as a unique gendarme, but 
also strongly contested because of its economic 
and military policies (Sansonetti, 1996). While 
someone shared American politics, many oth-
ers rejected it, attributing to usa instead an 
aggressive tendency, ready to force the hand; 
ultimately an unbearable conditioning. 
It follows the complex nature of the con-
cept of American empire (Del Pero, 2008). In 
fact, the international situation and, above all, 
the status of the United States at the time could 
not guarantee a true American empire: it would 
have been devoid of two essential resources: a 
military and economic power of constraint to 
maintain the exploitation’s level of the planet 
and an ideological universalism that could not 
fail trying to meet people’s desire to be treated 
equally; in fact, the latter sought an equality on 
which to build a true peace and lasting prosper-
ity (Rossi, 2013, p. 9). Surely, it had not helped 
the Americans military and economic over-
exposure of the first years of the new century. 
Although justified by the growth of the global 
threat, many observers criticized the unilater-
alism of Bush Jr. (Prestowitz, 2003; Ramasso 
Valacca, 2002). Despite this, the country had 
8 The term is used by Romero in his article Solitudine americana (2011). 
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assumed the role of defender of the free and 
democratic world. Other factors also contribut-
ed to isolate the usa. Bush insensitivity towards 
the needs of the allies, his excessive support for 
Israel, his skepticism towards international in-
stitutions. Also, his imperial pretensions and the 
overvaluation of military force, his propensity to 
neglect the soft power in all its manifestations 
contributed to deprive usa of allied support. In 
those years Bush seemed to have forgot, para-
doxically, that US nationalism should not have 
evoked the notion of ethnic superiority, but the 
belief in the primacy of democratic ideals (Rossi, 
2013, p. 7). It is indisputable that the United 
States was not and will not be in the future a 
power intent on creating an empire. They are 
not able to do it militarily or economically, 
since they do not hold the economic resources 
they need, starting with the control of the oil 
routes. Returning to that decade of transition, 
as Kupchan (2003) states, the United States had 
shown they had not understood the change then 
taking place. As Romero (2011) remembers, 
Washington had articulated its action on the 
idea of  a new international order, founded on 
an international community of a cooperative 
nature, supported by an ever-expanding liberal 
model. In the belief of being an indispensable 
power, the USA had not understood that the 
nineties, characterized by the absence of the 
Cold War, were suitable for experimentation 
of individual states or communities of states, as 
well as of groups or movements, also of violent 
nature. Without a precise or at least sufficient 
understanding of that time, they simply had 
tried to cope with the new terrorist threat, reviv-
ing an idea of hard power, now outdated and 
unacceptable.
In the same years, Washington began to 
experience a progressive economic dependence 
from the rest of the world; it was also aware to 
be perceived less and less as a genuine defender 
of the democratic and liberal order (Chomsky, 
2013)9. It was opinion of many observers that 
Washington had to proceed along a path of new 
sharing with Europe and Japan, those countries 
that had shared for a long time the same values 
and actions with the United States. It would have 
been the new American administration, led by 
Obama, to try to create a new platform of dia-
logue with the former allies, taking into account, 
unlike what done by Bush, the differences be-
tween the American model and the Western Eu-
ropean one, as established in the transition years.
6. oBAMA ANd ThE ExERCiSE 
of SofT PowER
Barak Obama’s arrival in the White House, 
greeted even with a Nobel Prize for the “good 
9 As pointed out by Sacco (2008), the United States presented itself as a country paralyzed by the rhetoric of the 
great individualistic and pioneering society, of which the Americans are impregnated to the tip of their hair. However, 
the ideology that in the nineteenth century had made possible the conquest and economic exploitation of the immense 
spaces of the Middle and the Far West, in the twentieth century, led to specular opposed results. Not only, it has led 
the destruction of the natural patrimony (the great resource of the past) and the atomization of individuals and the 
dissolution of the social bond. That is to say a situation that, in the political field, is concretized in the inability to 
elaborate a great collective project suited to the times and challenges of the 21st century.
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intentions” in October 200910, let hope for a 
re-consolidation of the West around the usa, at 
that moment not at all obvious. Even before his 
settlement, the Democratic candidate had well 
delineated his role in foreign policy: the renun-
ciation of atomic weapons, a policy of opened 
hand to Islam and a policy of friendship with 
the Russians, as well as an invitation to work 
for autonomy and independence of peoples of 
the African continent. It was clear that the new 
US administration led by Obama would not 
have kept a low profile in foreign policy and, 
above all, would have distinguished itself from 
that of President Bush. Obama was ready to 
concretely re-launch the US world leadership 
without the fear of shaking hands also with 
possible enemies. He seemed to launch a new 
American course and within it strengthen the 
existing multilateral alliances. Obama seemed 
to run for the role of bearer of a new idea about 
the United States in the world, which went 
beyond the attestation of exceptionalism; the 
American president identified the renewed and 
growing alliances and coalitions as an engine, 
a world laboratory of ideas (Valli, 2016; Nou-
gayréde, 2016; Zelizer, 2018; Maas, 2018). De-
spite the good intentions, the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring in 2010, which would have long 
inflamed the Middle East and North Africa, 
the return to the international scene of the Rus-
sian Bear under the leadership of Putin, which 
opened new and still unexplored international 
scenarios and, not least, the serious and over 
ten-year global economic crisis would have 
partially compromised Obama’s foreign policy 
goals. Nevertheless, not a few were the successes 
achieved by the Obama administration, even 
against strong internal political opposition. 
The President responded to the challenges of 
his time, primarily trying to heal the misun-
derstandings generated by the previous Bush 
administration in the field of relations with 
the European countries. He returned to an 
idea of strong cooperation between the United 
States and Western Europe, espousing some of 
the goals pursued by the EU in recent years: 
Obama’s great commitment to health, work 
and youth policies. He experimented a deci-
sive intervention of the state on the financial 
and banking system and, finally, showed and 
promoted an unexpected American interest for 
the protection of the Earth and the fight against 
climate changes. In 2015, the American signa-
ture of the Paris cop 21 agreement was hailed 
worldwide; for the first time, the United States 
was committed to reducing polluting emissions 
into the atmosphere. It was not the signing 
of the Kyoto Protocol but a first step, a solid 
American commitment to the protection of the 
Earth, which also involved the Chinese. “This is 
not a battle that every single country, however 
powerful, can do alone”, Obama added, “one 
day we can see all this when we finally decide to 
save the planet” (“Cop21, Cina e usa ratificano 
l’accordo di Parigi sul clima”, 2016).
In foreign policy, the Obama adminis-
tration marked three important successes: the 
capture and consequent killing of Osama Bin 
10 Thanks to Obama, the Nobel Prize Committee declared, the United States is now playing a more constructive 
role on major issues such as climate, democracy and civil rights (Beltramini, 2009).
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Laden in 2011, which healed - or attempted to 
heal - the wound of September 11, 2001; the 
start of relations with Cuba11 and the signing of 
the Vienna Agreements with Iran in 2015[12]. 
This latter was an important success, because 
with it the Iranians renounced nuclear power 
for military purposes. It had a second im-
portant consequence, it determined a greater 
isolation of North Korea, the last of the rogue 
states of the Bush era. As it was announced by 
the first Obama’s speeches, the hard power of 
the Bush era in the Obama’s modus operandi 
remained the last of the options. 
However, this kind of foreign policy, 
founded in primis on alliances and partner-
ships (a sort of pioneering smart power), has 
ended to assign to Obama presidency the role 
of weak government, mostly in the struggle 
against the Islamic fundamentalism, which 
in turn continued to hit mortally the Western 
world and to build successfully the Islamic 
State (IS) in Iraqi-Syrian territory.
7. iN ThE ERA of TRUMP’S ShARP 
PowER: SoME REflECTioNS
Approaching the conclusion of this paper, it is 
possible to state that with the end of the bipolar 
system, power has assumed and is still taking 
different forms, often incomplete, mostly 
unable to achieve results in the long period, 
but able to bring actions and reactions in the 
short period. What emerges with great clarity 
is the fact that if in the bipolar era the differ-
ent states could freely experiment themselves 
with forms of soft power - since the defense 
burden was entirely in the hands of the two 
superpowers – from the last decade of the 20th 
century, particularly in the aftermath of the 
attack on the Twin Towers, members of the in-
ternational community frequently had had to 
question themselves on the subject of defense. 
But, surprisingly, even in the face of a growing 
risk, such as that represented by Islamic fun-
damentalism, many European and Western 
states have continued to claim autonomy of 
behavior and judgment, declining any military 
involvement, once again confident that they 
could continue to rely on the military capac-
ity of the usa. 
In this behavior lies the failure of the idea 
that the end of the bipolar system would have 
given rise to a global society conformed to the 
Anglo-American model. This idea has sunk 
under the weight of terrorism, on one hand, 
and the emergence of the new social and eco-
11 Obama’s historic trip to Cuba in 2016 was the result of the thaw between the US president and the Cuban leader 
Raul Castro. The two statesmen decided to work for the normalization of relations between their two countries. After 
the re-opening of the respective embassies, an agreement had been made to restore commercial flights between the 
US and Cuba for the first time in 50 years (Di Ruzza, 2011).
12 “Thanks to the agreement”, Obama said, “the international community will be able to verify that Iran does not 
develop atomic weapon, Tehran will be deprived of 98 percent of its current enriched uranium reserves, an agreement 
that is not based on trust but on verification. If Iran violates the agreement all sanctions will be restored and there will 
be serious consequences. No agreement would have meant no limits to Iran’s nuclear program. The United States will 
maintain sanctions against Iran linked to the violation of human rights” (“Nucleare Iran, è accordo: via le sanzioni, 
controllo internazionale. Ira Israele”, 2015).
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nomic models in Asia and Latin America, on 
the other. Much has contributed the European 
Community, which, although in difficulty, has 
continued to claim and promote its social and 
economic model and its policies in favor of the 
protection of the Earth, and above all, its con-
stant refusal to assume responsibility for mili-
tary intervention. It has prevailed the European 
historic, cultural and economic model, and this 
at detriment of the American model (Obama’s 
one too), that Europeans always consider dif-
ferent from theirs. It is clear, that this imposes 
now more than ever an evaluation of the inter-
national status of the European Community 
(the unresolved problem of overcoming the 
Nation-State) and of its military commitment.
It is evident that the presence of Donald 
Trump at the White House, who seems to del-
egate only to the hard power the task of “make 
America great again”, has contributed strongly 
to the European debate. Trump, however, is 
not the only person to have such a belief. As 
Hillen (2016) recalls, the scientist Cohen goes 
on to define that world and its geopolitical 
setting: America has a good hand to play. It is 
a vigorous, prosperous, and inventive nation 
blessed by wealth, demography, geopolitics, 
natural resources, and other enduring sources 
of competitive advantages. But America’s 
advantages and interests cannot be secured 
without a sober appreciation for the necessity 
of hard power (Cohen, 2016). After the elec-
tion of Donald Trump, the author of Shock 
Economy Naomi Klein has talked of shock 
politics. As she underlines, also Kellyanne 
Conway, Trump’s collaborator, defines the 
American new era as a shock to the system. 
Not only, at international level Trump uses 
the menace of the military American power, 
at internal level he simply menaces to act and 
rule through continuous shocks. In this way it 
is possible to define his power as a sharp power. 
But his policy is largely feared both in America 
and Europe. As recalled at the beginning of this 
work, Nye has recently affirmed that Donald 
Trump’s policy is having a serious negative ef-
fect of reducing American soft power. In fact, 
as he explains, “sharp power is just a new term 
to indicate what we once called information 
war, which existed for decades, and in par-
ticular since the 1930s and during the Cold 
War. The information war will not replace the 
ability to attract other countries through soft 
power, which played a key role in the success 
of the United States and in the stability of their 
alliances” (Bechis, 2018).
But if we look closely at the actions taken 
by Donald Trump in his first year of govern-
ment, we see that he acts between nationalism 
and neoliberalism: an external nationalism (the 
duties on steel and aluminium, those on Chi-
nese products), an internal neoliberalism (tax 
reduction, complete liberalization of weapons, 
reductions in good environmental practices, 
reductions in privacy, attack on Obama Care). 
If we look at his approach to North Korea, to 
the nafta agreement, and also to the Iranian 
nuclear agreement, we realize that the concept 
of “enemy friend” loses its meaning: after all, 
India “is a true friend” until it doesn’t claim 
the maintenance of the H-1B (Rossi, 2017), 
as well as the Russia of Putin has recently been 
recognized by Trump extraneous to Russiagate. 
If European countries, as well as the BIS (Bank 
for International Settlements), are seriously 
worried about the new protectionist American 
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policy, they are also aware that “Trump’s words 
are an instrument for mediation but not a real 
menace” (Sarcina, 2018). What is certain is 
that Trump will continue in the wake of sharp 
power in the mid-term or, at least, until the 
polls show him as the winner, at least in the 
Republican field. Recently, Gallup revealed 
that 90% of Republican electors agree with 
the President.
In conclusion it is possible to affirm that 
twenty-five years after the end of the bipo-
lar phase the international system is still in 
profound evolution and the theses about the 
decline of democracies are arousing further 
insecurity. Fukuyama himself has recently 
stated that history is re-started as democracies 
are at risk:
“Democracy has legitimacy problems and gets 
little popular support in recent years because many 
democracies are perceived as weak. Every government 
has to make difficult decisions, guarantee basic rights 
and services to citizens and it cannot. The populism 
that crosses Western countries and advanced econo-
mics is the son of this frustration” (Iaccarino, 2017).
Surely it is no longer possible, as Keylor widely 
argued, to talk about the end of the nation-
state, that today results to be more than ever 
profoundly necessary. At the same time, it 
will not be possible in the forthcoming years, 
for any power, nation-state or community of 
states, to face up to concept of risk (now so 
variegated) without a form of power necessarily 
based on both elements of soft and hard power.
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